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GLENN T. BAIRD AND CLAUDE J. BURTEKSHAW' S BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE

We, the minority of the Logan Municipal Council, respectfully
request you, Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, hear
our objections to the decision of the First District Court issued in its
Declaratory Judgment of October 20, 19 77.
We are two of five councilmen elected in Ncivember, 1975, as
the first action of implementing a newly adopted form of government.
According to our understanding, Logan City is a legal and political
entity created by the State of Utah.

This means that the city government

performs its acts of electing officials, mc:king policies, and e:iforcing
them by the authority of the State.

It also means that city government

is an integrated unit--a whole system.
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J.IRGl: tv:Il\T
PCIJ\T I.
THI ORIG!.!'\

"~f

TEI DISPUTI

The newly adopted government was given by its adopted law six
months to change from the comm1ssior. to the council-mayor brm of
government.

The transition formalities appeared to have been

accomplished within the time limits and without difficulties.

This

seemed to have meant that the action agencies of the city were arrange:
so that all policy implementations were directly the responsibility
of the mayor.

The mayor's office alone became accountable to the

citizens of Logan for the executive functions of the government.

See

Sectic>ns 2-1-1 through 2-1-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City,
a copy of which is attached hereto.

This administrative organizational

rearrangemer1t, however, left untouched most of the substantive
policies and many of the intra- cLd interdepartmental practices develor'
in the previous system.

Much of the time would be needed to st\.:dy,

1:

where necessary ar:d desirable, change the language of the ordincnces
and the practice of the agencies to conform to the new system.

Cnticc.

to th;s study would be how the new system would relate to state laws;
which of these laws, if any, were not applicable to the new form, and
which ones were applicable but were to be applied in a different manne:
At be· t, the transition, examining and rewriting existing ordir.onces,
responding appropri:ttely to current business, end adjusting to new
relationships, would take months if not years to accomplish and much
µatiencrc,
The transition process had hardly begun when it was interrupted
and supi::rseded by a different issue, one that not only consumed much
time, but disrupted procedures and er.1otiorcally divided the membersoi
the council.

This disruptive issue carr,e concurrent with the new oyste"

The former government, the com mis s10n, in the closing days of itS

-2·-
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existence, finalized a transdct10:1 in which a depleted city gravel
pit was traded for other propert1e s.
contract was signed.

The deal was consummated--the

The commission, the personnel who made the

deal, the old system, was gone.
Three of the new council members opposed the transaction--they
were determined to undo the deal.
efforts.

We, two councilmen, opposed their

The mayor, too, who had been a member of the old system

and a party to the transaction, was suspect for his support of the
transaction.

Our feelings as councilmen were not that the transaction

was a good or bad one but that a decision had been finalized.

If

legal irregularities occurred justifying an attack, the court was the
appropriate forum.

Since the city had become legally obligated, it

should not initiate legal action against itself.
The three members, the majority of the council, however, felt that
the city, regardless of which form of government existed at the time of
the transaction, had made an uneconomical and possibly illegal deal,
and that they, the elected officials, had an obligation to correct the
mistake.

It was the dispute about whether the council should settle

this that the legal location of power issue between the council and mayor
developed.

The business of implementing the new system often took

second place, and finally was indistinguishable psychologically and
emotionally from the gravel pit one.

The gravel pit issue, in our

opinion, has not only distorted and disrupted the council in its transition
cctivities, but is at the heart of the Declaratory Suit and thereby
confuses the issues before the court.
In our opinion, the First District Court had ample reason to have
held that the issues in the suit were primarily political rather than
judicial, and in so doing would have supported the position to leave to
the city the business of finally defining and implementing the new form
of

government.

Such a denial would have permitted the city to use its
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legally prescribed procedures, those in the state law, its Organic
Act, to implement and give subst<:mce to the new government.
We respectfully ask the Supreme Court, therefore, to consider
the following reasons for reversal of the first District Court decree.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DISTORTS THE DISTINGUISHING
FEATURE or LOGAN CITY'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT
The lower court distorted Logan City's form of government when it
accepted, in the manner it did, the Declaratory Judgment Suit.

The suit

was initiated in Logan City Council by three councilmen in the name
of the city as plaintiff with a policy instrument they called a resolution.
The three members ordered the city to pay the attorney's fees.

The

resolution was used to avoid the mayor's veto and the needed vote of
four councilmen to override it.
POINT III.
THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURE OF LOGAN CITY'S
FORM OF GOVERNMENT
By the acceptance of the council's initiated suit, the court ignored,
and by its decision, destroyed the feature that made Logan's newly
adopted form of government distinctive--worth the adopting effort.

This

distinguishing feature of the state statute, Logan's Organic Act, is the
way it provided for effecting the city's governmental functions.

Without

this distinctive feature, there was no point in the state legislature
providing the additional legislation.

With this feature, Utah cities

could exercise their "ndependence in choosing the means of developing
and using their granted political power to provide the services and solve
the social problems of their local citizenry.

Why the state legislature

provided this variation of governmental form is noted in the statute's
introduction.

-4-
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The increasing demands for services and growing citizen
awareness and concern have strained tl-'1e ablity of Utah's
local governments to respond effectively, determines that
there is a need to provide optional forms of municipal
government under which citizens may vote to organize to
meet their needs and desires. (Section 10-3-1202, Utah Code
Annotated.)
Clearly enough the state legislature intended to create, by addition
to the law, a unique functional arrangement.

In the definition section

of the State's Municipal Code, it anticipates this distinctive provision
with a definition of the words, "governing body," which appear in the Code
to identify the governmental process and the ultimate responsible authority
of the various forms.

It means, says the Cede (Section 10-1-104),

"collectively the legislative body and the executive of any municipality."
"Unless otherwise provided" the law continues, the "governing body"
for first, second, and third class cities and towns is to be the commissions
or councils.

The Optional Forms Act, the one adopted by Logan,

unambiguously provides the "otherwise."

Tne "otherwise" separates the

two functions and thereby creates the unique system.

Note the language:

The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form
vests the government of a municipality which adopts this form
in two separate, independent, and eoual branches of municipal
government; the executive branch consisting of the mayor and
the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative
branch consisting of the council. (Section 10-3-1209, Utah
Code Annotated.)
The law prescribes the council's duties with these words:

"The council

shall pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal administration,
and perform all duties that may be required of it by law."

(Section 10-3-1210.)

The "governing body" processes, acco:-ding to the definition cited
above from the Code, include more than passing ordinances, appropriating
funds, etc.

It includes It.hat the mayor, the executive branch does.

The

Lie holder of that office shall, says the law, "Er.force the laws and

ordinances, " "execute the policies adopted by the council. " (Section 10-3-1219.)
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The two branches, in combination, form the political, legal entity,
the "governing body."

Their combined as s~c;r.r.cents make them a

unit, each performing a separate function.

L'le council is not

the action part of the city; it is not the fro:-.t off,ce.
is.

The executive office

The mayor, on the other hand, does not i::itiate policy or appropriate

funds.

The council does.

The mayor administers what is finally

determined by the "governing body" to be be city's policies and laws.
Each become specialists in their assignmer:t--the council in creating
policies for general application--the executive for the application of
the general policies to particular situations.
The process of determining policy and law is also prescribed by
the state law and the process so provided identifies the legal, political
responsibility of the two-branched system.

The process requires that

"every ordinance or tax levy passed by the council shall be presented
to the mayor for his approval or disapprovcl."

(Section 10-3-1214.) It

further specified that a part of a policy so srnall as a single item of
an appropriation, once perrritted adoptior. by c re solution, (Section 10-6-82
may be vetoed by the mayor.

Vetoed proposcls may be overridden by a

two-thirds vote of the council.

It is this p;ocedure for which there

is no provision for exception that makes foe system distinctive. At
least four elected officials create or approve every policy,
Tn

another section of the State Code, not the Optional Forms chapter,

the ordinance-making process is descnbed in detail.

To identify the

requirements of the statute with the proceciures for all cities, the state leg·
islature included this language:

1'1 municipalities where the mayor may disapprove an ordinance
passed by the legislative body, the oreinance must show that
it was passed with the mayor's approve! or that if the mayor
disapproved the ordinance, that it was ;;c.ssed over his disapproval.
(Section 10 -3 - 70 4 (10), Utah Code An;,:o~c.1ed.)

-6-
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In the same chapter of the State Code that provides for the procedure
to adopt an ordinance, the Code also provides for resolutions.

In

Section 10-3-717, the law reads:
... unless otherwise required by law, the 'governing body'
(both branches),* may exercise all c.dministrative powers by
resolution including but not limited to: (1) establishing water
and sewer rates; (2) charges for garbage collection and fees charged
for municipal services; (3) establishing personnel policies and
guidelines; and (4) regulating the use and operation of municipal
property. Punishment, fines, or forfeitures may not be imposed
by resolution.
It would be absurd to claim that these "administrative powers" were

exclusively the duties of the mayor permitting that office alone the
use of a re solution.
Except for the one restriction, the "governing body" has wide latitude
in its use of the resolution.

Presumably, the use of a resolution is

left to the discretion of the "governing body." (Both branches.)

Perhaps

by ordinance, the "governing body" could specify the uses of the
resolution.
To further clarify the procedure, the law states that the resolution
passed by the "governing body •... shall be rn the form and contain
sections substantially similar to that prescribed for ordinances."
(Section 10-3-718, Utah Code Annotated.)

Clearly, the resolution is

not an instrument apart from the pre scribed policy-making procedures.
Nowhere does the law provide that the resolution becomes an exclusive
means for council action.

The policies of the city, by whichever

instrument, are to be determined by the vote of at least three councilmen
and the mayor or at least four councilmen following a mayor's veto.
rrocedure is an unequivocal part of Loo an Citv' .s form of goverr.rnent.

This
The

jlCige had no legal basis to create a policy instrument which circumvents
the procedure and destroys the form of the system.
Much ado is made by the attorney for the plaintiffs about the meaning
c:•d use uf the words, "governing body."

It is not theory or pt.ilosophy

JOtes Sponsored
cJnd pare11thesis
are OUfS.
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which insures the distinctive form of the new systerr,.

It is the

procedu~

that guarantees it.
The lower court was being prejudicially selective in its choice
of the state law when it concluded that the coun::il was the "governing
body," and with that conclusion justified the circumvention of the
procedure.

The court's rationale for this conclusion was that the

same language was used to describe the council's duties in the 1977
legislation as in the 1975.

What strange logic.

The court's transmitting

interpretation gave meaning to the 1975 Optional Forms statute from a
law that applies only to commission and council forms of government.
It then gave the same meaning to the amended 19 77 legislation by noting
that the same language was used to state the council's duties.
statement of duties has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

The
The

court could have chosen a mo re relevant statute with common language
and common history if that were the proper method of establishing validity-·
and with relevancy to the issue.

A 1959 act, for which the Optional

Fonns Act in 1975 was substituted, uses the ider,tical language to assign
the council its duties, and it leaves ii ttle ambiguitJ a bout the intention
of the legislature to have the governing function shared.

Note the

language:
The municipal government of all cities of the fHst and second
class is vested in a mayor and a board of five commissioners
to be elected at large. The mayor shall be the chief executive
officer. (Section 10-6-7 8, Utah Code fa.n:iotated.)
The Board of Commissioners (councU) in cities of the first and
second class shall be legislative bodies of such cities and
as such shalJ pass ordinances, appropriate funds, and review
city administration and shall pe rforrn all duties that may be
required of them by law. (Section 10-6- 79, l,'tah Code Annotc:ted .)
It is clear from the 1959 statute that the cour1cil (commission), was
intended to have only the legislative function; in the 1975 act the phrase
"governing body," only meant legislative function (Section 10-6-104(2),

-8.
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Utah Code Annotated);

and in the 1977 c:ct the phrase "governing body"

was given the inclusive meaning of both functions.

The council's

procedure and duties are provided with the same language in the three
statutes, as is the mayor's.

The uniqueness of the system is the

sharing of the governing body function.
The judge of the court performed a sleight-of-hand trick when he
quoted the law creating two separate, independent, and equal brcnches,
noted that the phrase, "governing body, " had been eliminated from
the 1977 statute, and then with misdirected reverse logic announced
that "in examining the specific areas of conflict, the council will be
treated as the governing body." With this almost hidden conclusion,
all the issues of the case were decided.

The system had been distorted.

The system that shared political power ceased to be two separate,
independent, and equal branches.

The court was deceived by its own legerdemain

POINT IV.
THE DISPUTANTS APE LEGISLATORS
The District Court also erred in accepting the suit by failing to note
the role and function of the disputants.

The court gave no significance

to the fact that the dispute was between policy makers.
are councilmen, legislators for the City of Legan.

The plaintiffs

The dispute was

between them, the two of us, and the mayor in his policy-making role.
The dispute that provoked conflicting legal opinions and ultimately lead
to this suit was a proposed ordinance that was vetoed and failed in
an attempted override.

See Section 1-6-6 of the Revised Ordinances of

Logan City attached hereto (marked as Defendant's Exhibits "B" and "C").
To claim that this dispute was "judicial" is to ignore the role of a
legislator and the conditions necessary for a response to that role.

The

conditions for legislation must be such that the legislator may be
cieli berate and free to make choices between alternative possibilities.
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Legal or judicial interference renders this c:i1scretionary activity
meaningless and representative government becomes a hollow activity,
The role is a creative one to discover solutions to social conflicts
and problems.

To identify a dispute between legislators in the

course of the legislative process on a policy question as "legally
ripe for judicial determination" is to make legislators accountable to
the judge for their policy decisions.

Legal accountability means that

legislators may be sued in court for their decisions, i.e. , if the court
listens to them as plaintiffs, how can it not as defendants.

For the

legislative function to be significantly useful, the discretionary featur'
must be protected; the legislators must be accountable primarily to
their voter constituency.

The legislators cannot be both politically

accountable and judicially subcrdinated during the process of the
legislcitive activities.

The election pro vi des for political accountabih:

1he legal or judicial process makes for legal accountability.

The

judge, by accepting into his court t.his suit from these city legislators,
failed to note the difference be tweer; the two responses.
of

powc~rs

The separc:tic

doctrine recognizes the elen>er;t of accountability in assigni:

functions to sepurate, equal branches of government.

It is a crucial

element in Logan City's peculiar form of government.

The differences

in assigned functions are to be ncted betv1een the office of the mayor
and the council.
citizens.

ooth cire politically responsible by elections of the

The rr<"tyor, however, is additionally legally accountable

for the perforrnci1cce of his administrative assignment.
Legislators take the same oath of office as do the jurists.

They

beth swear to uphold federal and state constitutions and the Jaw. Bot
must be free to make decisions in their areas of assignment.

If either

is interrupted ill its processes, their effectiveness is diminished.

- l 0--
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POI1'T V.
INTIRHRENCI: WITH THE CITY'S PROCESSES

Having refused to note the significance of permitting legislators
to be litig<rnts on policy issues, the court, with impunity, invaded the
legal entity of the city.

The city has a jurisdictional area of authority and

a procedure to determine policies and enforce them.

Not only is it

essential that legislators be free from unwarranted judicial interference,
it is equally important that the city in its legislative functions be
independent and maintain its initial responsibility over its jurisdiction.
The court has failed to respect the integrity of the city and recognize
its independence.

For the court to claim that the disputes are

"ripe for judicial determination" is not only to misunderstand the role
and the identity of the disputants, but it also ignores that the issues being
disputed are policy-making ones.

Here it should be noted that although

defendant's counsel has stipulated with plaintiffs that the "issues" raised
are justiciable, those parties should not be allowed to confer jurisdiction
upon the court where none in reality exists.

Most of the issues had not

been discussed by the council, and all of them, unless the court
directs the voting of the council, must yet be determined by the legislative
process.
The court chose to pronounce an ordinance (dated September 16, 1976),
which was not raised as an issue in the Complaint, as being inadequate.
It cl so chose to interpret financial procedures, tr an sf er of funds, which
cc '-'ld have been and still must be accorr:plished by ordinance.

The

external auditors and the state auditor are responsible to interpret fiscal
procedures.

The plaintiffs took the fiscal issue as a complaint to the

c0urt rather than to the council.

It had not been discussed in the council.

There is even a question as to whether there would have been a dispute
in the council.

If there was a legitimate one and the judge took it
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seriously, he could have invited the auditors, state or external, who
are initially responsible, to explain the prcctice and the Jaw.
The real property transaction complaint of the suit was stated
deceptively.

It was stated as though someone, we or the mayor,

supposed that the mayor could, without authorization, buy, sell, or
lease real estate.

·we have insisted from the beginning that the mayor

only performed those functions that were legally authorized, adopted
by an ordinance, resolution, or appropriation.
that the mayor has inherent power.
activities be legally authorized.

We did not contend

We insist that all of his

What we oppose is the involvement

of the council in final or administrative action.

We disagree that

a transaction authorized by ordinance, appropriation, or policy
directive needed a second or final council involvement.

Final participat.

in a property transaction is no different from the final act of buying a
car, a typewriter or a basketball.

The judge's declaration about the

inadequacy of an existing ordinc;ice was cbout the council's involvement
in the latter kind of transaction a'.1d was adopted not because we agreed
we needed it, but as a compromise measure among the different position:
of councilmen.

But regardless of the degree of involvement of the counc::

such activities are the prerogative of the city's "governing body" to
be stoted in ordinances.

The judge's ar:ceptance of this complaint not

only distorts the procedure, il shows his failure to inquire about and
to understand the ncture of the dispute.

The remedy or decree of the

court b a presumpti"ve intervention.
The court ordGr that only the council can approve of innerblock and
planned unit developments is evidence of the court's misunderstanding
of the separation of powers system.

Basic to the theory of the system

is that skilled administrators execute a policy made by the council
with far more equity and efficiency than an untrained council.

The

judge of the court in declaring the ordinc:nce that assigns this function
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to administration as being illegal, had no basis, legal or otherwise,
for his declaration and interference.

and judgment of elected officials.

This was within the prerogative

The claim of the judge is that approving

these units is similar to approving subdivisions, therefore, is governed
by that state statute.

He does not say, however, why a decision

about it cannot be made by the council.

The writers of the state statute

did not anticipate the Optional Forms Act or clusters or planned
unit developments.

Is the is sue so legal as to be beyond the decision

of the city policy makers?

The court could just as well have decided

that subdivision, as well as cluster and planned unit requirements, could
have been complied with by an ordinance assigning the final approval
to city administration.

This would have permitted consistency and

would have conformed to the new system's conceptual procedure
of the "governing body".

Is the risk of the ordinance being subsequently

declared illegal in this circumstance different from those of any other
legislative action?

Certainly the concern one way or another on any

of these matters does not have the urgency that justifies judicial intervention
into the city's "governing body's" procedure by a Declaratory Judgment
intervention.

And if they do are there any disputes in the council and

between council and mayor not subject to court action?

\Vhat kind

of city policy is not subject to court intervention during its formation?
The court claims that section in the State Code, (Section 10-3-1215),
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the council over its internal matters
and is not, therefore, subject to the mayor's approval or rejection.

But

the court fails to define these kinds of matters--we believe that if
there are matters exclusively the concern of the council, that they should
be distinguished by an ordinance (with the mayor's signature).

The rules

und order of business for conducting the council's business is, no
c'oubt, sufficiently critical to be prescribed by ordinance.

'I'nis would
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add to citizen understanding and trust of fr_e p:ucess.

Following a

legally prescribed procedure may avoid the c:ppearance of arbitrary,
whimsical action.

But this, too, is the cou:-:cil's business.

We also believe that an action involv1:-.g expending money for
whatever purpose, this lawsuit included, is the city's business and
is subject to the ordinance-making proced1C.re for both its appropriatwn
and expenditure.
The court, in disagreeing with this belief, seemed to imply the
method of seeking legal coun se 1 we: s some!-iow beyond the determinc:tion
of the procedure of the "governing body."

Is deciding if the municipal

council needs legal counsel different from other issues decided by the
council?

Is it different because the judge believes that councilmen have

an inherent right to counsel which the court must insure?
has the court guaranteed it?
can decide.

If so, how

The judge hc.s said that three councilmen

What happens to the rights of t::ie cinority of two or one;

how will thPy be assured of paid-for cour,sel?

D:::Jes a three member

majority vote have less minority problems ttan four?
In the court's Declaratory and Injunctive Ee lief, the judge completely

invades the city.

He declares that with a council-passed resolution, it

may pay the fees from appropriated or generc.l funds, and to insure that
it is not interferred with, he forbids the mayor to veto the council's
efforts to pursue thR three members' position of the "gravel pit"
transaction.

By what legal principle may a veto be denied?

l'u1d then

how is this proccsf:: distinguished from the one by whieh the judge
permits that by ordinance the councH controls finances.
and how contradictory!

How informative

However, the judge :ir,ally admitted that the

business and the method of the council is t8 pass ordinances, appropriate
funds ••.. etc.
Finally, the jud0e "permanently enjoir:ed the defendant or his
from interferrinq with the plaintiffs in the exercise of their duties
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determined by the Declaratory Judgement." One need not even be a
litigant in the judge's court to be threatened with his orders!

He does

not answer, do the plaintiffs retain their rights of plaintiffs after they
cedse to be councilmen, and/or do all succeeding councilmen become
plaintiffs?
POINT VI.
THE RELIEF AND REMEDY--POLITICAL, NOT LEGAL
Most court action concludes with directives to the defendant based
upon the rules of law stated by the court.

The only order to the defendant-

mayor is not to interfere with the plaintiffs' court-assigned claims.
'There is only one way the defendant could interfere and that is with
the veto.

He is specifically forbidden to veto the gravel pit investigation.

This is unnecessary since the mayor is denied participation in the newly
created resolution.

In this suit, however, most of the remedies are

dependent upon action by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff legislators

sought court reversal of their political defeats.

The implementation of

the remedies is by council action with the resolution.

The political nature

of the remedies is clearly evident, however, when it is noted that the
remedies become dependent upon the agreement of the council members.
By court decree, three council members' complaints became legal;
by the same court decree and court-invented procedure, the three
council members in council implement the remedies.

(See Exhibits "A-D"

attached to defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena which is a part of
the trial court record.)

For three months, they, with their new procedure

and court support, the three council rre mbers have been doing all
the things they wanted.
But what happens where there is disagreement?

For example, what

happens to the "gravel pit" issue or the hiring of legal counsel and any
other related matters if the three cease to agree?

Even more critical

to this case, what happens if to pay for this suit or some other suit, an
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appropriation of funds from the city is necessary?

Has the judge

changed the city's procedure so that three council members can approprit
city money as well as direct its expenditure?
court decree, appropriate funds?

Or does the judge, by

What happens to the appropriation

by ordinance requirement?
What happens when new councilmen take office?

Even if by

succession, as directed to the defendant-mayor, they may become only
plaintiffs, there were no council member defendants and there are
none now.

Could new council members be under court order to favor

the policies of thP plain ti ff members ? V\'hat happens if they do not?
Do disputes that once were "ripe for judicial determination" retain

their''.ripeness" '? Or does it take the three council members to make
them "ripe"?

Has the court declared a legal principle that all councils

shall retain legal counsel? Are all councils to investigate "gravel pit"
like transactions cind rescind them if they disagree?
provi.ded a principle aboul the city fund transfer?

Has the court

The procedure for

buying, selling and leasing property 7 V\'hat if by unanimous agreement
the "governing body" chose to implement by ordinance and with approval
of the state auditor, different fund management practices?

Will the

court intercede? And if it does, do all elected officials become
defendants?
The court really has not stated principles that would be useful in
determi11inq when disriutes brocomf' legally "ripe," or which kind, or at
what point a council can expPct j11d1cial interference.
cictually

t1iJS

The court

left nothing foe the office of mayor to do differently since

currentl)r he executes only those policies fnat were determined by the
"governin,;i body'·.
Clearly, the court is entirely dependent upon the political process
of the council for implementation of its remedies.

A better solution

-16-
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may have been for the judge to join the council and become its constant
legal and political conscience.

There he could, with complete abandon,

function in the political arena that he has chosen for himself in this
case.

The dependency on the council by the court for remedial

implementation makes it apparent that the is sues in the suit are political,
not legal.
THE SUMIV'.ATION
We are mystified as to why the court felt compelled to accept the
case.

The plaintiff council members were clearly legislators.

disputes were about the business before the council.

The

The plaintiffs

were unsuccessful by the legal procedural requirements in the municipal
council.

Had they been successful, with one more vote, there would

have been no court suit.

Or had only two of the elected officials been

disappointed, there would have not been one.

Of the many is sues stated

in the initial suit, one is all that was actually discussed in the council
at the time of the adoption of the resolution; the remainder were attached
by the three council members or their attorneys but never presented for
approval to the council.

The many added ones were concoctions, which

could have been council business, but were never legitimately before
the council.

Why the court would choose to join these legislators in

pursuit of their policy issues is beyond our understanding.
the court's remedy is to join them in their council vote.

Obviously,

Since the

plaintiffs, once away from the court are beyond its control, they are
free to pmsue whatever issues the three of them and their attorneys
agwe to.

It is even more mysterious how the court could justify

tampering with the legally prescribed procedures simply to accommodate
plaintiffs' legislative interests.
It is difficult to understand how the court could read statutes that

define Logan's government as being two separate, independent, and
equr,l branches of government and the phrase, "governing body," as
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meaning collectively legislative and executive, and then in total
contradiction, conclude that the council 1 s tl-ie "governing body".
It is equally difficult to understand how the court legally questions

the state legislative language that provides a distinctive councilmayor form of city government.

All the other statutory forms give

distinctive responsibility to councils or commissions.

Is it not possible

that the legislature intended to copy for the cities, the federal and
state constitutional model that separates functions of government? And
could it not have believed that with the separation feature the same
purposes of other governmental levels be achieved at the local level?
Is there a belief by the court that the principle of the "rule of law, " the
legal purpose of separation of power, cannot be implemented in city
government 7 And does the court question the need of the city for the
political device of check and balance?

Perhaps the court does not

believe that the state legislators noted, as the founding fathers did,
that by separating legislative from the admir.ist:ative functions, that
they guarded against the inclination of policy r.:c.kers to change policies
when they administer them.

And that many policies could only be

fairly administered by experts, trained to see policy purposes and
distinctions provided in policies formulated by a separate branch.

Many

legalists believe that law.:> have a better chance of being general and
prospective, a rule of law requirement, by the separation of powers feature
Does the cow·t question that

ci

responsible uniform administration is

best attained by a single publically responsible administrator?
The cowl could do well to clarify its objective.

It gives no hint of

i !legality to i he 0 ptic,nal Forms l\ct yet it questions, distorts and seems
to deny the law's obvious intent to be a unique form.

The special

political interest that provoked the Declaratory Suit seems to have
directed the court's legal conclusions.
The fudr;e of the first Judiciril District, rc.ther than clarifying the
low, has confused it,

ThJs may have hc.ppP.neo because he refused to
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recognize in his decision that a form of municipal government was at
stake.

He did not permit hearings and gave no indication of how, what ,

or when he was making his decision.

Most of the complaints were

unsubstantiated; some of the charges were of no consequence and some
were not even controverted.

The judge seemed to be unconcerned

with the truth of the complaints or the significance of his decision.
The court leaves much in doubt about Logan City's form of government.
The mayor, questionably involved, was mistakenly the defendant and
appears to have lost the case.

Logan with the State of Utah may have

been a more appropriate defendant, for their form of city government
was the issue.

Rather than defining the role of the office of mayor,

the decision leaves many unanswered questions about the office.

The

law still states that the mayor's office is a separate, independent, and
equal branch of city government, sharing in the "governing body"
activities.

The judge says that the office is subordinate to the "governing

body" council.

The law states that the mayor is responsible to the voters

for the administration of city policies.

The court says that the mayor

is responsible to the council for administration.

The law says that the

mayor shall participate in all policy making by signing or vetoing
ordinances, resolutions, tax assessments, and so on.

The judge says

that he cannot veto resolutions or other actions that the council interprets
as exclusively its business.

If the intent of the court was to clarify

the relationships of the two offices, it failed.

For us, it only confuses.

To us, the Utah State Legislature provided for the creation of two
separate, independent and equal branches of government.

It made

the branches separate by distinguishing two functions and assigning
one function to each branch.

It made the branches i ~C::ependent by having

the officers in each directly responsible to the electorate.

It made the

branches ~~by the checking features that each has on the other.
The District Judge has tampered with the system.

He did not declare

it invalid, though to h:JVe done so would have made what he did more
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understandable.
intended form.

Rather, he has destroyed or distorted it beyond its
We, therefore, respectfully ask the Supreme Court of

Utah to reverse the First District Court's decision.
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Claude J. Burtenshaw, Councilman
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Glenn T. Baird, Councilman
Logan Municipal Council
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IXHIBIT "A"

13
TIT1~I

2

CITY GCVIRNMH:T

Chapter 1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Depa:r·.me:it ~ for Cny Go'.·e:-::m ent.
Appointi·;,; Of:icer:::.
Bonds and Oaths fo:- City Jff1cers.
City Jltwmey.
City Auditor.
City Eiectricia:-i.
City Engineer.
C1 ty Record e!"
City Treasurer.
Chief of Fire D'=par:m e::t.

Chapter 1.
Departments for City Government.
Section 2-1-1.

2-1-2.
2-1-3.

2-1-4.
2-1-5.

2-1-6.

Bra:-iche s of Cny Government.
The Executive Branch.
The Judiciai Branch.
The Legislative Branch.
Municipal Cour:cii Meetings.
Mayor--Powers a:-id Duties.

2-1-1. Brar:ches oi City Gove:;-:ment.
be divided into three main branches·

The City government shall

(a) Judicial
Legislative
(c) Executive

(b)

2-1-2. The Ex.::cut'"'~ B:-a'"!cb_. Tne Executive Branch of government
headed by the Mayor as the Chief Executive Officer is hereby divided into
tw0 .cdministrative ievels, the upper level being designated "department"
end the lower level being designated "division" w [thin a department.
(a) The depa;-~ments of the admrnisuat1ve branch of government are
dc:fignated as foiiows:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
('))

(E,)

Department of Police
Depa:1m0ri1 ot Fire
IA.f:'dl':mer:t o: Rc..:;_rear1on
D'-"par~m,,~,; o~

t:nvirn-.;.<.ntal Eealth and S::ilid V\faste Management

u~-l-'"~;·~~~-:r:- ... :t o~

l\drni:uc;t_rction

0 ~,,
Dep0:rm
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(7)

(8)
(9)

Depar:me:-ic o'. Pari<.s
Depar1.me;i'. o' L1b"Fl:J'
Depa:---:ment o: Power

(b) 'fne:--•-e f'hoill oe
of Admi:·11s:-auo:1:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

1_-r··~

:oiiowi:lg ::!;v1sio·1s within and under the Departmer:

Pc;rch::i;;1;--,q ~:--_6 S10:e; D1-·i sio:-i
Person:-iel D1·:i 510r.
Treasu:-2~ s DiYision
Reco:-der-Accoc;nti;-ig Division

(c) There shaii be che ioli:Y.Ni;-ig cn·isions within and under the Departmer.:
of Public Works:

Airpo,-: Di··1s10~.
Property a:-:c S·.a:ding Mal'agemerit Division
Gardge and Mo·,o• Pool DiviEion
Water and Sewer Divis10n
Cemetery DPision
Pianr.ir:g Di.>·ision
SL"aetE D1-.·i sion
(8i Engireen:ig Di"''swn

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(d; The C1 ;y ,:,,:o:·:--.r,;· a·~-:J Budg·;; Of:fice: o'. the city shall be staff
advbors to the chi-J'. ,_:.:1 -"cuti ;e of:,, __ er.
1

(e) Tne genf'•ai :._,:1::·1or::::, po·.v:;~.:; ar.d duties of each department
and departmer.t head a:-r.: cs follows·
(lJ .QSQ?.::l'.JlE''' c;" Polic.;; a00 Poli-:e C!Jief - The function of the
Department o~ Police i~- to p:--e~8"'•'•3 i:.he peace and good order of the city, to
detect jnd trrnu ail '.,iolc«o:F of :-ctace and city iaw to justice, to prevent crime
and protecl li!e :inc ci·ope;:.y and 'o pc:r-'.orm 311 other functions as required by

law,
h is the CLl1Y ,me: iund1on of the Ci'iie1 of Police to direct and control
the activities ot che Po]JC•' Depa-1ine,1t and to perform all other functions and
duties as required by iav,.
(2) .P.2R_q::_:.!_T',__~~c~)Jrc c"ld Fire Ch1e_f - The general function of the
fire Departmsnt is lO p~;:·Jent io~ s of life and proi:erty by fire by enforcing
:'.ire p'."ev2ntion iaw s ei:18 - egul::it.io11s, and by extinguishing fires and to perforr.
;'Ill other function!' r-0 d·1ties a~c required by law.
It is th'? cLi-::v o~ tic" Fire Chie'. to control and direct the activities of
t;w Fin: D·3P.'l'-Trn·:''' c; d 'O c_e'2 to :he p-opec educction and training "Jf its
person:1el 1oqe1"r:c:~1 -\'•'1~:: 7_:--rt- p:·op-~· !T'IO!L l2:-1L::ir.ce of all rire Dcpertr:riEnt equipn'
I

(S[C:DONS 2-1-1 to '1-1-6 ,wenrif
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and to peGorm all other functions and duties as required by law.
(3) Department of Rec;eation and its Director - The Department of
Recreation t1as the function of assessing the current recreati::rnal needs of the
city and of organizing and of!"ering a broad range of recreational and leisure
time programs for the citizeris of Logc:n. In carrying out this function, it
has the responsibility to coordinate programming efforts with other existing
agencies or entities in the community, It shall perfonn such other functions
required by law.

The Director of the Recreation Department has the function and duty
to assess, organize and supervise, the recreational and leisure time programs
of the city and perfonn such other functions and duties required by law.
(4) Department of Environmental Health and S'Jlid Waste Manaaement
and its Director - The general function of the Department of Environmental
Health and Soi.id Waste Management is to perform all functions of the city
with respect to health and sanitation. Said department has control of the
proper operation of the city's sewage lagoon and solid waste disposal systems.
It shall perfonn all other functions as required by law.

The Director of the Department of Environmental Health and Solid
Waste Management shall direct and control the sewer lagoon system and the
solid waste disposal activities of the city, He shall conduct inspections
and tests where desirable or necessary. He shall perfonn all other functions
and duties as required by law.
(5) Departmer.r of Administration and its Director - The general
function of the Department of Administration is to provide general administrative
services in support of all other departments, divisions and staff officers of the
city, and to supervise the managers of the divisions of Purchasing and Stores,
Personnel, Treasurer, and Recorder-Accounting, and to provide the Mayor with
infonnation regarding the activities of those divisions and to coordinate their
functions and activities. It shall perfonn all other functions as required
by law.

The Director of the Department of Administration shall exercise general
supervision over all divisions within said department. He is responsible for
providing the Mayor with administrative infonnation regarding the general or
overall operations of the city and perfonn any other functions or duties required
by law.
(6) Department of Public Works and iJs Director - The general functions
of the DepartmeEt of Public \/\forks are to supe;vise ancJ direct the managers
of thF DiviE1on of the Airport and the Division of Property and Building Management,
the· )/,, 1 , ir Pool Dh·i s iun, the \•Vate:- and Sev.· et· Division, t..l-ie Cemetery Division,
tf, "ic.nninq D1·:ision, Iii<' SLect:: Di'l.·ision, and the Engineering Division. It
~·-:··c"·11,, all oth'=r foroc-tions as required by law.
~')-,,) Di~Pc1or
ofthe the
Department
offor Public
\\TJrks
i::upervises
the Services
managers
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projects by prog~amming the cooperative dfo:is of the needed departments
and d1,·1sions of the city, He perfo::-m s ali otlie' fc;nc':wns and duties as
required by law.
(7) De_Qa"tment 01- Parlcs and its Director - The general function of
the Department oi Pa~ks i- lo marntai:: and imp~ove the parks and the Wilbw
Park Zoo, and to super;•ise :he pla:-;ting and ma1rtaining of trees and other
plants on city proper:1es i;-icluding alongside streets, and to perfonn all
other functions as required by law.
The D1:-ector of the Department of Pa,~ks shall supervise, improve,
and maintain ali cny pa::-ks. tile V\Tillow Park Zoo, and all other city property
assigned to his care, and per:'.orm all other functions and duties required by
law.

o:

(8) Depa-cmer:+
Lib:-ary (lnd its Board of Directo.:s. The Library
Department shall ope:-ate, maintain and care tor the city library and perfonn
any other functions rec;uired by law.

The City Library Board of Directors shall supervise the operation,
maintenance ond care oi the library including the adJpti::m of rules and
regulations not ir,consisten• with law, for the governing of the library, shall
appoint the city libraria;;, and perform such other functions and duties as
required by \av; .
(9) :Q_fil;i;j-tm~_u__t oi_Powe~_sind its Director - The general function ofthE
Depc:rt~nent

of Pmve~ is to fu:-nish adec:uate electrical energy to all
those rieedi:-i') the same anr:l located within the city. It shall perfonn all
other functions required by law,
1he Dite::wr of the Depanme:-1t of Power directs and supervises
the operation of the city; s diesel power plant, its hydroelectric plant and
the tra::smissior: and cis:.ribut10n of all electricity within the City of Logan. H€
shail perform all other :unctions and duties required by law.
(£)

Th':'; Qe'ie1·al fur:ct1ons of e:a,_:1 division within and under the Departmen'.

uf Acim1n1Slrat1on ar,d their mar.agers are as follows:

(1) The Pu_rc:_b_Q.~j:-10 and Sto.-es Division and its I\~anaaer functh;;i of the Divlsion of Purchasing and S<:ores is to perchase all
supplies and other personal prope:i:y for the city's departments and
divisions upo:-, the best tenns and for the best price possible. The
al so accounts fo::- end co:-n:-ols the inventory of said property for the
r•erfo::-ms all other iu;1ctions as required by law.

The general
the equiprn1
Division
city, and

The Ma:iager of the Division of Purchasing and Stores acts as purcha:
cqent for the ::1ty in sacu:_-i;-,g ali the Eupplies, equipment, and other personal
p:cpcrty :--e1"did '•y ih<? c1•y's departments end divis1·Jns a~1d controllicg and
:no::ito;1n~1 u-,,~ inve:1lO"V o_i Ll1e ~awe
He shall pe~-orrn SUC'h '.'ther functions I'
cutie5 requHed hv Jm·,,
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(2) The Perso:inel Division a!"!d its Manager - The Division of Personnel
,hall establish and implement guidelines and procedures in the city's hiring
~rocess, promotions, discharges, etc. to insure compliance with law affecting
and regulating employees and employment relations. It shall suggest and implement
such practices and policies as will in sure the acquisition and rentention of
qualified employees for the city, and perform such other functions as required
by Jaw.
The I\l'anager of the Personnel Division shall carry out the goals and
functions of said Division including the proposal of wage schedules that adequately
reflect market conditions to assure retention of qualified personnel for the
city. He shall also supervise and assist all department directors and division
managers in hiring city personnel, and perform all other functions and duties
required by law.
(3) TrE?ast:rer's Division and its Manager - The Treasurer's Division's
functions are to take custody and account for all monies, bonds, or other
securities belonging to the city and to perform all other functions required by
Jaw.
The City Treasurer shall be responsible for the proper receipt of all city
monies, to accurately account for and take custody of the same, and perform all
other functions and duties required by law.

IE

(4)

Recorder-Accounting Division and its Manager (i) The general furr::tion of the Division of the City Recorder is to
keep the records and papers of the city including contracts, deeds,
ordinances and re solutions and to keep a record oi the proceedings
and the meetings of the governing body and perform all other
functions required by law.

n:

The City Recorder shall countersign all contracts made in behalf
of the city and make a record of all contracts, properly indexed.
He sha 11 attend the meetings of the governing body and keep a
record of their proceedings and keep and file such other records,
documents, etc" of the city, and perform such other functions and
duties as required by law.
(ii) Tne accounting functions of the Recorder-Accounting Division
are to ini.tiate and ins tall systems and procedures including
internal control procedures within and among the various departments
and divisions of the city, to keep or cause to be kept the General
Ledger and General Journals for all city funds, prepare payroll and
payroll reports, and to conduct the billing cperations of the city,
and to perform all other functionE required by law.

Th::: clau processing furcti:J;-,s of the Recorder-Accounting Division
~i.pport to city operations, and to
µe;-iorm
any
other
functions
required
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'-'!_ (g) The general !u'lc1ior'S of each d1v15ion wichin and under the Department
o(Pub!ic 'vVorks a:-id 1:v;;1r ma:-.agers ?.re as foilo-,>5.
(1) Aj_rQo::-;: DL'15ion __a_I,i__Lt':.Jl_f,3•,cger - (A) The Ai;port Division shall prov
adequate ai;-5erv1ce '.aciii:12~ for t'.1e cny a:1d i1s occupants arid perform all
·
other functions as required by law.

(B) The Mar.ager of , ...,e Airpon Di•.·i~ion ohail manage the airport facilities
and maintain the same and perfo~m ail ocher :ur.c:ion.s ar.d duties required by law,

(C) The County of Cache is hereby designated as the manager of the
city's interest in the airport a:;d is he;e!:Jy delegated ali of the rights, responsibik
and duties in connection he:-p·.ivith. If '!:he Mayor deems appropriate, he is
hereby authorized to prepare and negotiate, a contract with the County of Cache,
setting forth in greater detail, the managemem duties of Cache County and
formalizing the relation.> hi? ::' ··eP:-i :he :::ounty a~.d the City of Logan with respect
to said airport .fac~ii'c1es. Tn:-o ··~oi..:ocy i:: s~so he:eoy authorized to e:-iforce any
and an agree me··:~' :JE;t·.ves:-. ·'1e cou~ ·y the city :ind third parties with respect to
use of airpo:i fo:::ilnies,
0

'

(2) l'.rnJ1.en:::-:._2;:;.d__ !)_u1j_~iri::1..Ma_~~.ag_?_~:r:,;:,n~_ _l2Ll?L91l and its Manager The general ~·... nctio'1 o. t:1"' P:opcr'.f a"._j Buiiding Management Division is to
maintain, ~~p:iir 1 Lnp !""Cr·", a:-; . o·. c.c-::oee rn.:.. lr;a=ing o: managing of any city
propc.-.H s :-iot di IE:::; y did ;:,..,; - j ;),' :; ·,o+ r,"-: di· ris iO'.' or d·-:Opartment of the city and
to perform .Olt OT."18r .:,nc:.0;1 · re.:_,11~,;d oy ~a·N.
Th2 M=- ~a::wr o~ t"'l~ P:o0Grv· a·,r, 3u1i di•,g Ma:·.agement Division shall
Sllpen·ise t:1e ma:,-;e: i1·1:0:-, r'-)Jsj- a•1c ;;r,:::i:o .c;rnen~ o:' city properties, and to
mc:-iage other ci;y p··oo"'-'-.1· _, a:10 1e i"l<'~Crit•ed and per:::orm any other duties or
functions reqw.ireci ty !aN.

(3) g_~@S'!.'."._.: _!':1~9.'~ f.9.9·:o__=_)J..)_;:jg~:__'i_'liJ.IL_Man6qP.r - The general functions
of ihe Garage and Mo LOf Pool D1·.:\sw:1 c:t 10 r.iaintain and repair ail motor
vehicles and similar equipmer:i_ owr:ed :::Jy ",he city
It shall supervise and
co0rdinate the use of city mo 1.or 'rehic!E-s among c:nd within the vc:rious departments and divisions to faci~1:at.e a more ef:icient and economical use of said
vehicles and perform a:1y other function5 provided by law.
0

ThE Manager of the Garage and Motor Pool Division shall supervise,
control ar.d manage the mcir.te;10nce ar.r:l repair of tbe city's motor vehicles and
sir.1ilar equipment a:-id super.·i.>e and coor::hnare the use of said vehicles among
the ciepa rtments and di·.ri s ior,: of the city. He shall perform all other functions ar
duties required by law,
(4) \!\'al§I__a_o_c)__~s_we• P.i\1i~"_ion and_Lts Mcn_ager - The general functions
of the ·water and Sewer Div; sio'I are to provide all persons and entities within
the city with ar: adeq •..:ate w<:Her ~ ,1 pp~ y cs well a~ effective sewer and dr cinage
service, end to per'orm such other fur;c~ions required by law.

Thf:" j\ffan.r,qe of the ·,.\~5t_er d""it: s~:'-•JP,[ D1\ ision =up':!\.'1S---:s, 6.S~igns and
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l6b-l
inspection of any part of the city's water a;-id sewer system,

He shall perform

all other functions and duties required by law.
(5) Cemetery Division 'lnd its Manager - The general functions of
the Cemetery Divisio!-i is to provide the public with an adequate cemetery,
properly managed and maintained, and to perform all other functions required by
)aw.
The Manager of the Cemetery Division shall see to the proper division
and organization of the cemetery into lots and spaces, sell lots, collect fees,
(SECTION 2-l-2(g){l) amended 4/7/77)
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manage and fup2rr1:;e bun<:>l.5 anri pi-o'..·emen: 0£ heac!swr1es and supervise burials
and placern,:;;-,t. o': head5:o:ies a:-irJ supien·1se lhe p~opt!.c care and maintenance
of the ceme1eryo He' shall pe:-'.:orm all oth'°'- L.cicuons and duties required by law,
(6) .!J.9~ring_D.c:uj:,>r1_~l'."l_i',..5 J\ia:0 ag'"r: - The general funstions of the Cr
Planning Division a'.·c co act .~:o processional stcd and advisor to the City
Planning Comrn1ss10n anC:: sll oc.her city departments c.nd divisions needing
such planning secvice or a-:J\·1c e. Said di vis wn al so evaluates all pending
building permi!s a:-,d desig:-:;o and evaiua1es city-initiated projects needing
planning service or advice
It shail perform all other. furictions required by law,
o

The Mar.age:- o:f -:.he Planning Division, or City Planner, shall assist otbt
departments and divisior.s in evaluati:-1g all pending building permit applications::
assure the proposed project's complicince with current land use ordinances. He
shall assist the public in obtaining and uc-1derstanding the city's land use and
zoning ordinances, and guide fo; development. He shall supervise the
perfonnance of all other functions and dutief' o: his division and any other functic·
or duties required by law,
(7) _Street;: Di·.J.c~i_Q.oL<L'l~l_i_ts Mq__nager::_ - The general functions of the
Division of St:-eet.s arP to S'2e to the proper construction, maintenance, and repair
the c::y streets, sidewalks <::Llrbs, gutters and other fixtures under the city's
control and lo·::ated upoll :he cny·s highways, roadways or rights of way. It
shall perform all othet· :'unctions reguired by law,
. I

The Manaq S!" of the Division o" Street 2 shall supervise the activities
and schedulinq o'.: work in ire di\·ision and assure the proper operation and
mcEntenance of all e:i-uipment within said division. He shall review all work
done by anyone on t'"ie ci'!:y ootr2e:s to assure its compliance with applicable standr
He o.hall perform all othe:- :'·Ll:-ic:tions and duties required by law.
(8) _I._'1_~-f~'..2.!'.~~~~29_f)t·isi_OIJ.-.S.:C:d its Manager - The general functionsoi
En<;!ineering Divis10;\ a".'e :o provide n·~cessary engineering se•vices to all other
department:; and di1.-1"ions of the city, to act as ci.:rtodian of records of public
ir1,1xovemen:s (Hlen·.i!:i;tng the detail of thei: construction and location), maps, pk
plats, pro~iie~', dnwir-,ys, estimates, ar,d specifications which any way relate to
the p11blic 1::ip:o·;erne:1ts 3,1:: e:igii>eering afhirs of the city. The Engineering Divi~
shall he.ve c:eneral supe,vi510n of all r::onstruction wofk to see that it cor;Jonns to
dty plans c:~:d to f"lS•"'ifica' 10r:s. inc.Juding the superdsion of the building inspection
functions of the city. It Eha ti perform ail other functions required by law.

The City E!1gi:>eer o.'. M:inager. o' the Engineering Division shall exercise
general cont.col and supervision over the fu:i::tions of the Engineering Division.
He shall al so aci: <4S the city· r t:-a:':fic en<]rncer and perform all other functions and
duites requ1~ed by iaw.

(1)

C~_;-.~~J~l~Q.~-~,:.;.y -

I'"n'~' (:jty AP.o~_'ley E}~a11 <:;i,re thf: c1t~l government,
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the business of the city. He shall draft all ordinances, resolutions and contracts
when called upon to do so and shall represent the city in all legal actions
wherein the city is a party. He shall perform all other functions required by law.
(2) City Budget Officer - The City Budget Officer shall perfonn such
functions and duties as are necessary to as sure the city's compliance with the Utah
Uniform Municipal Fisc9l Procedur-es Act (U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 10-10-23 and
sections following). He shall perfonn such other functions and duties as required
by law.

2-1-3. The Judicial Branch.
Judge, his clerks and staff.

The Judicial Branch shall consist of the City

rcr

J
2-1-4. The Legislative Branch. '!'he Legislative Branch shall consist of the
Municipal Council with staff assistance to be furnished by the Executive Branch
through the chief executive officer.

2-1-5. Municipal Council Meetings. (a) The Municipal Council shall hold
its regular meetings two (2) times each month as follows:

On the first and third Thursdays of each month at 5:00 o'clock
P. M. at Logan City Offices.
(b) Special meetings of the Council may be ordered by the Chairman, a
majority of the Council, or by the Mayor. The order must be filed with the Recorder
and must be signed by the person or persons calling the special meeting and
must !:·t: entered in the minutes of the Council. Except in case of emergency,
as decicred by the Mayor, not less than two days notice of any special meeting
must be given by the Recorder to each member not joining in the order, the
notice of the meeting to be served personally or left at his usual place of abode.
All regular meetings of the Council, to which any person not a principal officer
is admitted, must be opened to the public.
2-1-6. Mayor--Powers and Duties. (a) The Mayor being the chief
cdministrative officer of the m~nicipality shall have such powers and duties as
specified by the 0 ptional Forms of Municipal Government Act as it may be
amenccd from time to time and such other dut1es as may be required by law not
mconsistent with said Act.

(b) The Mayor shall furnish the Municipal Council with a monthly report
settinc; :orth the amounts of all budget appropriations, the total disbursements to
date from those appropriations, and the amount of indebtedness incurred or
cur:tracted against each appropriation, and the perce!1tage of the appropriations
iric ..'71!'e:-ed to date. Said monthly report shall be due to the Council from the
Mayor on the third Thursday of each month for the prior month's expenditures
e.r,d re\'eiues in accordance with Section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated.
(r:) 111e Tllfayor shall also :oubmit to the Municipal Council at the end of
i·.cJ, cu,,;t
. " ~;ucemc..nt of income anc expencitures of each utility fund

(SECTIONS 2-1-1 to 2-1-6 amended 7/1/76)
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I

reflecting their operation to the date of said statement for the current year
ar,d comparing said period with operating results for the same period during:
preceding year. This statement of income shall be due from the Mayor to the
Municip:il Council on the third Thursday of the month following the end oftne
preceding quarter in accordance with Section 10-10-70, Utah Code Annotated
1953.
.
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